To preserve the unrestricted authority of reason in the moral sphere, Kant argued that the scientific use of reason yields knowledge of appearances only, not of things as they are in themselves. This trade-off sparked both consternation and controversy. Among Kant’s contemporaries, the most prominent—J. G. Fichte—set the terms for “German Idealism”, the project of constructing a consistent rational system on the basis of Kant’s “Copernican Turn”. In the second half of the nineteenth century, neo-Kantian philosophers pushed back against this idealism—as did Dilthey’s hermeneutics and the Brentano-inspired phenomenological movement—without fully escaping its pull. Underlying these developments, as G. Anthony Bruno shows in his splendid new book, was anxiety over the “fate of reason”.
The past fifty years have seen an efflorescence of studies that interpret the yield of these post-Kantian takes on a “science of intelligibility” (2), and Bruno’s philosophical-historical reconstruction of the path from Kant to Heidegger engages extensively with that literature. However, his choice of Fichte’s neologism, “facticity”, as fils conducteur is quite original. Facticity is not equivalent to empirical facts. As expressed in propositions, facts have a rational structure; “facticity”, in contrast, is a portmanteau for any element in a philosophical system that appears as a “brute” given or rationally ungrounded posit. Examples include Kant’s “rhapsodic” Metaphysical Deduction of the categories, and his undemonstrated claim that the faculties of sensibility and understanding are toto caelo distinct (22, 58).
While the German Idealists found such brute givens unacceptable, difficulties in eliminating them nudged later philosophers toward accepting that reason’s reach is limited. Bruno sees Schelling’s late “positive” philosophy as the turning point, and he subsequently provides illuminating chapters on Emil Lask’s alethiology, Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics, and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology. Thus, the fate of reason—from Kant’s appeal to “the primacy of the practical” to Heidegger’s embrace of the “primacy of the factical” (92)—confronts us with a decision: either continue the search for a science of intelligibility, as did Husserl (92-96), or accept that intelligibility is not rationally grounded but ever remains a matter for interpretive understanding.
Bruno embraces the latter. Though philosophy can identify the factical conditions that enable our meaningful engagement with things, this does not yield a rational Letztbegründung; we can only make sense of things piecemeal and from within. Philosophy occupies a “unique modal space” where it discerns “conditions of intelligibility whose necessity is not logical yet whose contingency is not empirical” (3). For instance, in recognizing that “thrownness” contributes to making Dasein’s understanding of being possible, Heidegger identifies a condition on intelligibility that is “neither logically necessary, since [its] denial is thinkable, nor empirically contingent, since [it] characterizes Dasein’s very being” (219). With Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, we can entertain the thought of rationally grounding such a condition, but doing so “exhibits a kind of inauthenticity”, a “dogmatic slumber of sorts” (3).
The argument supporting this conclusion proceeds in three parts, devoted to three “crises of method” in the historical progression from Kant to Heidegger.
The first concerns Kant’s “transcendental” logic, which locates the ground of empirical knowledge in the transcendental unity of apperception, the “I”. Because the I is not given in intuition, it is a cognitively dubious concept whose ambiguity lends itself to conflicting interpretations. To some, the Critical Philosophy represented thoroughgoing skepticism; others complained that it could not refute “Spinozism”, meaning the “atheistic” or “nihilistic” possibility that the ultimate principle is not the I (freedom) but nature (necessity) (33, 80). Bruno carefully explains these worries and provides an illuminating account of Fichte’s initial attempt to address them by appeal to the I’s practical consciousness of freedom, an “intellectual intuition” of itself as both act and fact: Thathandlung (51). When this proved insufficient, Fichte attempted a “genetic deduction” of the “oneness of fact and act”, but Hegel deemed this a merely “subjective” idealism, a judgment that “amounts to a charge of vestigial facticity” (73, 100).
Unfortunately, Hegel’s own efforts to transform Fichte’s dialectic into an “absolute” (fully presuppositionless) logic produced a second crisis of method. For Hegel, neither the subject’s freedom nor the object’s “being” provide an adequate starting point for philosophy. Instead, one must attend to the way one-sided notions of subjectivity and objectivity are negated and “sublated” in experience until one attains to the “speculative concept”, where genuine idealism—a dialectical science of intelligibility no longer misled by the merely apparent gulf between subjectivity and objectivity—can be pursued (99-153).
Dialectics itself falls into crisis, however, when Schelling—“a pivotal yet neglected figure in the history of the concept of facticity” (7)—detects a different kind of presupposition in Hegel’s method. Because Hegel’s logic is propelled by “negation”, it must presuppose the “reality that [it] is meant to rationalize”, namely, “the existence that contributes to intelligibility” (178). Mirroring the metaphysical question of why is there something rather than nothing, Schelling asks, “Why is there meaning at all, why is there not meaninglessness instead?” (182). On Schelling’s approach, then, as Bruno astutely notes, “intelligibility demands not just the deduction of the whatness of things but also the presupposition of the thatness of things” (198), thereby locating facticity in an “existential register” (214). As Schelling argues in Die Weltalter, rationalizing that presupposition “is never complete” because it “is coextensive with the whole of history” (209).
The third crisis of method concerns attempts to thematize “meaning” (Sinn), which is what “intelligibility” becomes in a context where it is no longer simply identified with what is rationally grounded. Here, under the heading of “hermeneutics”, Bruno considers Lask, Dilthey, and Heidegger—spiritual heirs of Schelling who find various paths back to Kant.
In his approach to categories, Lask, Rickert’s student and the author of a thesis on Fichte, develops a “fateful” yet “productive misreading” of Fichte’s concept of facticity as the “material” moment in a categorially formed object (223). The object itself, “untouched by all subjectivity”, is “original” meaning. However, because original meaning includes an “a-logical” material moment, it is an “haecceity” which the categorial form that “holds” (gilt) of it cannot render fully “transparent” or rational (247, 237).
The idea that philosophical reflection can be presuppositionless is finally abandoned by Dilthey, who substitutes hermeneutics for dialectics. “Life” is unhintergehbar; there is no point at which the interpretation of things passes over into rational grounding. Finally, Heidegger’s Being and Time combines Dilthey’s hermeneutics with Husserl’s phenomenology to transform Kant’s transcendental analytic into an existential analytic. His “hermeneutics of facticity” uncovers conditions of intelligibility but abandons the idealist hope that a sufficient reason can be given in answer to Schelling’s “why” question. For Heidegger, as for Bruno, philosophy’s cardinal virtue is not rationality but authenticity, facing up to the fact that reasons give out.
A brief review cannot do justice to the philosophical sophistication and wealth of historical detail our author employs in advancing his thesis, so rather than pick at nits, let me conclude by considering an issue that Bruno does not directly discuss, though it strikes me as relevant to reason’s “fate”. Let us assume that Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology does full justice to facticity’s negative implications for the project of rational Letztbegründung. Does it also offer a positive account of reason appropriate to the existential situation it describes?
As does Robert Pippin in his recent book, The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy, Bruno seeks a way forward after implacable facticity has silenced Hegel’s claim that reason is the law of the world. Rather than follow Pippin into the later Heidegger’s “poetic” musings, however, Bruno looks back to Fichte. Having presented Heidegger’s account of existential breakdown, where Dasein learns that the “turn to authenticity is simply a matter of decision”, he quotes Fichte’s dictum that “the kind of philosophy one chooses […] depends upon the kind of person one is”, adding only that “Heidegger’s conception of the authentic turn shows that the kind of person one is remains radically open” (300). This seems right, but does it mean that reason’s role in philosophy is radically open as well? For one type of person, reason’s role is to organize scientific facts into a theory; for another, it seems “the most stiff-necked adversary of thought” (Heidegger, 1977, 112)? Or might it be that the phenomenon of authenticity itself yields a role for reason that reflects the “radically open” character of the person?
It is somewhat curious that Bruno devotes only a few paragraphs to Being and Time—dealing with the relation between authenticity (resoluteness) and the unified phenomenon of anxiety, death, and conscience (298-300)—and focuses instead on works that precede and follow that text. First, drawing on lecture courses from 1919-1925, Bruno traces Heidegger’s “phenomenological redirection of Dilthey’s method of hermeneutics” into a “hermeneutics of facticity” (262), and he mainly focuses on Heidegger’s attempt to show that the “theoretical attitude” is inappropriate for capturing “factic life’s” self-understanding. Second, drawing on works from the eight years that follow Being and Time, he reflects on a topic not pursued in that text—metaphysics—which is not directly concerned with “being” (Sein) but with the totality of entities (All des Seienden) (1962, 292). Here, Heidegger focuses on the question that seized Schelling: Why is there something rather than nothing? And he is concerned to show how “mood”—specifically, “our anxiety before the Nothing”—“attunes us to facticity” (262). Meditating on the proximity of “being” and “the nothing”, their mutual non-entitative status, engenders “awe” at the utter contingency, or facticity, of beings as such and as a whole.
Being and Time, however, is neither a hermeneutics of factic life nor an inquiry into the metaphysical why-question; it is a phenomenological reflection on the conditions that make an understanding of being possible. One such condition is that there be a being, Dasein, who is concerned with what it means for it to be, and the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity designates two poles between which such concern oscillates. Where does reason fit into this picture?
Many commentators hold that authenticity is indifferent to normative reason, so upon arriving at Bruno’s conclusion—that the “turn to authenticity [in Angst] is simply a matter of decision” and that “there is no court to which my heeding [the call of conscience] can appeal” because “recognizing the authority of any such court” depends on my “choosing to choose” (300)—such commentators will hear confirmation of their view that Heidegger’s philosophy is decisionistic or nihilistic. What is needed, then, is an account of the role of reason when facticity is understood in an “existential register.” Bruno provides us with the proper starting point—authenticity involves “committing to be responsible for norms as such” (300)—so let me conclude by sketching the conception of reason that follows from it: Such a commitment entails that reason-giving is an obligation constitutive of authenticity.
In Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s radical individuation—the breakdown of its everyday mode of being—the existential categories of affective thrownness, projective understanding, and interpretive discourse appear, respectively, as anxiety, death, and conscience. Publicly established norms lose their grip when anxiety renders Dasein affectively insensitive to them. This in turn is existential “death”, because without affect Dasein cannot act, cannot “project into possibilities for being”. Finally, the call of conscience is the discourse that articulates the meaning disclosed in this situation, silently giving me to understand my “guilt” (Schuld)—that is, my being responsible (verantwortlich). So, in articulating the meaning of Dasein’s radical individuation, the call, like Fichte’s Aufforderung, is a demand to “take over being a ground”, an originary responsibility which, because Dasein is being-with-others, is equally a demand to be answerable to others (1962, 328-331). And to be answerable is to be obligated to give an account of oneself, to offer one’s reasons (grounds) to others in what we might as well call the “game” of giving and asking for reasons.
Admittedly, this conclusion doesn’t sound much like Heidegger, but Bruno’s book invites us to think not only beyond the German Idealists, but also beyond the letter of Heidegger’s text to discern what it phenomenologically entails. And Heidegger does provide some purchase for this “violent” reading. In On the Essence of Ground (1929/1998), he identifies three senses of Grund—corresponding to the three categories of thrownness, projection, and discourse—maintaining that discourse (that is, the call of conscience) is responsible for reason in the sense of “giving an account” (1998, 130-131). Heidegger provides a further clue when he characterizes Plato’s “idea of the good” (to agathon) as the norm at issue whenever I act (1998, 124). As Socrates suggests in the Phaedo, something becomes my reason because I think it best in the matter of what to do, be, or believe. Giving reasons, then, would be part of what it means to be “responsible for norms as such”.
Bruno is right that reason provides no ultimate grounding and so there is no final “court” in such matters. Nevertheless, authenticity does not bottom out in an irrational decisionism, a petulant insistence that “I am right”; instead, it entails being answerable to others, offering my reasons and receiving theirs with an open mind. This is far less than what the German Idealists sought, but it too belongs to the fate of reason after Kant, which Bruno’s timely book does so much to help us understand.
REFERENCES
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, 1998).
Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,” tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).