A Philosopher Looks at Friendship

Sophie Grace Chappell, A Philosopher Looks at Friendship, Cambridge University Press, 2024, 208pp., $12.99 (pbk), ISBN 9781009255547.

Reviewed by Michaela Manson, Simon Fraser University

2025.07.10

A Philosopher Looks at Friendship

In eighteen compact chapters, Sophie Grace Chappell’s A Philosopher Looks at Friendship provides a wonderfully readable introduction to many questions and debates under the umbrella that is the philosophy of friendship. These include typical questions about the nature and ethics of friendship, e.g., “What is it?” and “What does it demand of me?”, as well as questions about the appropriate philosophical methods for investigating friendship, “Can philosophy really say anything true or useful about friendship, and if so, how?” To this last question, Chappell offers a somewhat ambivalent answer. The very project of writing a book on friendship in a series titled “A Philosopher Looks At. . .” reveals Chappell’s optimism that philosophy can say something true and perhaps useful about friendship. At the same time, much of the book criticizes traditional philosophical thinking about friendship for failing to do just this. The result is a fine balance of critical and positive claims about friendship and the philosophy thereof, useful to a novice in the subject area, while still appealing to those with more background in the topic.

The first chapter begins by introducing some popular examples of friendship: Donkey and Shrek from the children’s film Shrek, Harry and Sally from the classic romantic comedy When Harry Met Sally, and the male relationships depicted in Nick Hornby’s novel, High Fidelity. The choice of examples reflects two points to which l repeatedly returns: (1) the examples with which one begins reflection tend to determine which claims about friendship one is inclined to find plausible and which implausible; and (2) philosophers have often failed to recognize contingencies inherent in their (often too high-minded) examples of friendship. As a result, much philosophy of friendship has over-intellectualized the phenomena, mistaking local peculiarities for friendship’s eternal essence, and yielding accounts that are “deeply unrealistic, inhumane, and indeed inhuman” (l, 41). Aristotle (chapter 9), C.S. Lewis, and Anders Nygren (chapter 10), are all explored as instances of thinkers who exhibit this failing.

Instead, Chappell’s examples are intended to reflect popular ideas about friendship: that friendship is a role with special responsibilities like loyalty, that it is importantly different from romantic relationships, and that it is generally good for humans albeit with some risks. These popular ideas become the focus of investigation in the chapters that follow and, in the end, except for the distinction between romance and friendship, are mostly vindicated.

However, rather than use examples of friendship to isolate their common features in service of articulating a definition of friendship that is resistant to counterexamples, Chappell adopts the method of natural history: observing the phenomena of friendship over the course of a human life (chapters 5 & 6). Chappell is careful to note that a natural history of friendship must recognize the different social, cultural, and historical inflections of friendship. Yet, despite such variation, Aristotle was right about one thing: humans are social animals; or, in Chappell’s terms, it is a brute fact that humans prefer being with other humans and that human lives tend to go better in the company of others.

From this brute fact, Chappell launches a criticism of philosophy’s tendency to start by thinking of human beings as independent, rational actors. Rather, as second-personality theorists argue, personhood is essentially relational, relying on others for both the development and recognition of those capacities taken to characterize it. Chappell uses this analysis to explicate one part of her “loose definition” of friendship (and love) as “benevolent companionship over time” (46). By companionship, Chappell intends mutual second personality, two (or more) persons taking each other to be persons. While the benevolence involves wishing the object of one’s beneficence well, this attitude is compatible with the benefactor’s indifference about how the well-being of the beneficiary is realized. This is different from how a lover and a friend wish their beloved well in that they wish to be part of the story of realizing the beloved’s well-being. This wish is expressive of such interpersonal regard and investment. The qualification “over time” captures how love and friendship similarly involve loyalty, a continued choosing of each other. While it may be highly contingent who we end up loving and befriending, insofar as it is a matter of contingency where we are born, educated, and employed, etc., lovers and friends aren’t thereby warranted in trading-up upon meeting someone new who better embodies the qualities that might have led to a relationship in the first place. Rather, the history and commitment of a relationship provides a unique kind of reason that justifies “dancing with the one you came with,” as the saying goes: reasons of love as opposed to reasons for love, that is, reasons generated by loving someone versus reasons for loving that someone (see Abramson and Leite 2011).

Of course, despite their similarities, love and friendship differ, as Chappell thinks they should, in being, on the one hand, an emphatic good in the case of love, and, on the other, an unemphatic good in the case of friendship. Romantic love is an emphatic good in the sense of being something declared, demanding attention, emotionally intense, fodder for great comedy and tragedy. By contrast, and contrary to philosophy’s scrupulous, moralistic examinations of it, friendship is largely unforced, unattended to, operating on implicit assumptions, typically only becoming an object of scrutiny when an issue arises. Chappell uses the turbulent friendship of Russell and Wittgenstein (chapter 12) to illustrate the mistake of mistreating friendship as an emphatic good, as Wittgenstein did. Wittgenstein’s constant interrogation of reflection about his friendships was at odds with friendship’s tendency to “[flourish] best when we don’t make a big song and dance about it” (l, 138).

Indeed, Chappell takes the very nature of friendship being unemphatic in this way to account for part of the difficulty of philosophizing about it. Friendship is tacit, innocent, and non-moralistic, in ways that often elude philosophy’s typical tools for interpretation and theorization (chapters 13, 14, 15 & 16). The sense in which friendship is tacit is that it often relies on tacit knowledge, while at the same involving virtues that themselves are dependent on tacit knowledge: spontaneity, unselfconsciousness, and humility. Explicitly trying to be virtuous in any of these ways undermines the very virtue; like these virtues, friendship is a kind of doing that is impeded by attempts to be virtuous. Similarly, friendship is innocent in the sense that it typically precludes certain kinds of thinking about justifications and alternative possibilities in a manner that is at odds with much of moral theorizing.

Chappell’s penultimate chapter articulates some of its benefits of friendship: animal compresence is a source of basic physiological and psychological comfort, mutual liking provides emotional affirmation, while mutual respect assures us of our dignity and worth as persons, and admiration, the recognition of our abilities and achievements. Friendship is also a source of growth, enabling friends to accomplish shared goals, as well as a source of self-knowledge, even a kind of memory that supports the authorship of one’s life narrative. Perhaps most significantly, it enables the expansion of one’s interests from merely individual interests to the interests of broader collectives, collapsing distinctions between self and other, and allowing for the emergence of an ethical union whose goods are shared among its members.

Finally, Chappell bookends her piece with some materials aimed at those seeking some pithy quips of philosophical wisdom: aphorisms at one end, quickfire questions and answers at the other. The latter provides a quick summation of Chappell’s claims and their entailments, the former, purportedly, of the history of philosophy of friendship.

It is with the prelude of aphorisms that I want to begin offering some critical reflections. For, though this list includes one quotation from a source beyond the usual Western suspects (“Only make friends with those who are better persons than you are” (Confucius, Analects 19.3)), it does not include any quotations from women. (Surely, Heloïse’s “For my heart was no longer with me, but entirely with you”[1] illustrates something important about second-personality and love, of which friendship is a species even if different from the passionate bond of erotic lovers.) This oversight is striking as it clashes with Chappell’s otherwise conscientious attention to issues of gender elsewhere in the work: sexist dismissals about women’s capacity for friendship, the affirmation that one is likeable and worthy of respect and admiration that friendship provides the marginalized, as well as gendered differences in expectations and experiences of friendship. Likewise, the all-but-one absence of aphorisms from non-Western sources, belies Chappell’s lesson about the importance of recognizing cultural variety when extrapolating about the phenomena of friendship; might not the same be true when extrapolating about the philosophy of friendship? The risk is that such choices reinforce mistaken ideas about friendship, and perhaps philosophy, of which Chappell is otherwise critical: that they are the special province of a relative (western, male) few. This is especially worrisome if, as Chappell claims—and I tend to agree—“to describe is to prescribe; to represent is already to intervene” (48).

Of course, this absence is not limited to the aphorisms; if it were, this criticism might be justly dismissed as petty. Yet, the history of philosophy of friendship (and love) that Chappell presents and criticizes, though it includes Iris Murdoch (1919–1999), leaves out important contributions by women philosophers from Heloïse (c.1100–1164), to Mary Astell (1666–1731), to Audre Lorde (1934–1992). Significantly, their inclusion in the narrative of the history of philosophy of friendship would have both supported and challenged some of Chappell’s central claims. For one, it reveals that theorizing about friendship, at least in the so-called western tradition, though perhaps not wildly popular, was at least not entirely restricted to male philosophers. Like Chappell, these women have already challenged the tradition’s otherwise misogynist assumptions about women’s capacity for friendship, and, thereby, to a degree, also challenged some of the tradition’s idealistic tendencies.

At the same time, many of these women philosophers write about friendship in a way that Chappell would criticize as distorting, too high-minded and moralistic; indeed, this was partly Damaris Masham’s (1659–1708) criticism of Mary Astell and John Norris’s account of love (Masham 1696, Astell and Norris 1695). Perhaps not surprisingly, for some feminist women philosophers, friendship is treated as emphatic good, in part, to challenge the purportedly emphatic good of marriage that often, in practice, was not good for women (see Astell 1700, Beauvoir 1949, Card 1996, Goldman 1911, Pizan 1405, Suchon 1700, Wollstonecraft 1792). In contrast to the limitations and subjugation imposed by the institution of marriage, friendship among women has been variously lauded for its consciousness-raising, transformative and emancipatory potential (see Astell 1694, De Beauvoir 1954/2020, De Pizan 1405, Friedman 1989, Lorde 1984, Lugones 1995, Suchon 1700, Wollstonecraft 1792).

The difference between this feminist portrait of friendship and that of Chappell is in part a consequence of their differences in aims and methodology. For the most part, Chappell is content to describe the phenomena of friendship and honour many pre-theoretical intuitions about it. However, many feminist philosophies of friendship are unapologetically normative for the very reason that some pre-theoretical, customary practices and beliefs are worth changing. Indeed, if to describe is to prescribe, as Chappell maintains, we might worry that her account of friendship tolerates some bad beliefs and practices where it shouldn’t. For instance, Chappell writes, “obviously there is such a thing as a toxic friend” (22). Although, to be honest, I’m not sure how common this intuition is, as I can imagine many people, upon discovering some betrayal, reporting, “Well, I thought she was my friend,” implying a previously mistaken assessment. If this is right, then maybe some of philosophy’s high-mindedness that Chappell finds objectionable isn’t always as distant or distorting as it seems to be. Or, perhaps, when it is, as in the case of feminist philosophy of friendship, its being so isn’t always a bad thing.

These critical remarks notwithstanding, A Philosopher Looks at Friendship is a thorough yet accessible work that seamlessly blends insights of philosophy, literature, film, and even Chappell’s own poetry, while providing a realist corrective to philosophy’s traditionally idealistic tendencies in appraising friendship. For that, it deserves the attention of those interested in friendship and the philosophy thereof, whether one is encountering the topic for the first time or, like an old, loyal friend, finds oneself revisiting it again.

REFERENCES

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[1] Translation my own, Lettres d’Abélare et d’Héloïse, II. §6, on page 80, 1875.